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COURT OF APPEALS, 1961 TERM
implies broad state regulatory authority, it is to be expected that a majority
of cases in which the state exerts authority over a fund will involve a fact
situation quite similar to Thacher. Whether this case indicates an attempt
by the Court to draw a line on any growing trend toward federal pre-emption
of authority in all fields involving labor relations is still open to question.
I R. S. M.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
RESTRICTED APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE OF FORGOTTEN NOTICE

Respondent signed a paper for an employee, which the employee represented as a statement of his earnings for the year 1957. Respondent, unable
to read or write English, often had his wife read important papers before he
signed them. Although she was present in their home when this transaction
took place, she did not read the paper. Somehow suspecting that the statement
might have been a promissory note, which indeed it was, respondent thereafter
consulted his attorney, who advised him to notify all banks in the county
not to accept any instrument made by him payable to that employee. During his
performance of this task, he entered the First National Bank of Odessa and
explained his problem, in broken English, to the cashier, stating the name of
the employee and that he had been deceived into signing the paper. The teller
assured him "not to worry." Three and one-half months later, a regular
customer of Bank to whom the note had been endorsed by the employee, presented it to the same cashier for discount and it was accepted. At maturity
Bank forwarded the note to respondent's bank, which refused to honor it.
Bank brought suit against respondent for the value of the note. The lower
court rendered judgment for Bank, and the intermediate court reversed. On
appeal, held affirmed. "Under the peculiar facts of this case" Bank could not
apply the doctrine of forgotten notice since it had assured the respondent that
it would not discount the note, that Bank was not a holder in due course, and
that the respondent, therefore, was not liable to Bank. First National Bank v.
1
Fazzari, 10 N.Y.2d 394, 179 N.E.2d 493, 223 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1961).
The pertinent New York statute in this situation is Negotiable Instruments
Law sections 91, 95, and 97.2 The provisions of these sections, which are similar
1.

13 A.D.2d 582, 212 N.Y.S.2d 380 (3d Dep't 1961), reversing 22 Misc. 2d 351, 193

N.Y.S.2d 367 (County Ct. 1959).
2. N.Y. Neg. Inst. Law §§ 91, 95, 97, which provide in part:
91. A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the
following conditions:
1. That it is complete and regular upon its face;
2. That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without
notice that it has been previously dishonored, if such was the fact;
3. That he took it in good faith and for value;
4. That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any
infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it.
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to those embodied in the statutes of numerous other jurisdictions, 3 are clearly

intended to protect a holder in due course where a court faces the task of
imposing a loss upon one of two innocent parties.4 Case law in New York
has provided the balancing protection for the maker of an instrument by providing him an absolute defense against a bona fide purchaser where the signature
or note was obtained through fraud in the absence of negligence by the maker.r
Where notice of a defect is given the purchaser prior to the purchase, his
negligence or lack of diligence in subsequently acquiring the instrument has
been excused under the doctrine of forgotten notice. This doctrine, based upon
the rationale that "the rights of the holder are to be determined by the simple
test of honesty and good faith, and not by a speculative issue as to his diligence
or negligence," 6 may be stated as holding that if notice of a defect in the
instrument is forgotten by the holder-to-be, the defrauded but negligent maker
does not escape liability (upon the instrument) to the forgetful holder. Thus
the holder is not bound by the notice given him except by the limits of good
faith. Whether the transaction was made in good faith must depend upon the
facts of the case. The doctrine was first set forth in Raphael v. Bank of
England,7 and was brought to this jurisdiction in Lord v. Wilkinson.8 This
theory has been followed in numerous New York cases9 and has been applied in
other United States jurisdictions in recent years.' 0
The decision in the instant case is a rare departure from the forgotten
notice doctrine. The trial court without question based its decision upon the
doctrine and held for plaintiff Bank," citing the long line of cases in which
it has been applied. In not submitting the paper presented by the employee
95. To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title
of the person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of
the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking
the instrument amounted to bad faith.
97. In the hands of any holder other than a holder in due course, a negotiable
instrument is subject to the same defenses as if it were non-negotiable. But
a holder who derives his title through a holder in due course, and who is not
himself a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument, has all of
the rights of such former holder in respect of all parties prior to the latter.
3. E.g., Purdon's Penna. Stats. Ann., Title 12A, § 3-302(1); Ann. Laws, Mass., Ch.
107, § 75; Laws of Ohio (1961), Title 13, § 1301.54; Ill.
Ann. Stats. Ch. 26 § 3-302(1);
Gen. Stats. Conn., § 42a-3-302(1).
4. Cf. Munnich v. Jaffe, 164 App. Div. 30, 149 N.Y. Supp. 388 (2d Dep't 1914);
Page v. Krekey, 137 N.Y. 307, 33 N.E. 311 (1893).
5. See Chapman v. Rose, 56 N.Y. 137 (1874); Hutkoff v. Moje, 20 Misc. 632, 46
N.Y. Supp. 905 (N.Y. City Ct. 1897); Carey v. Miller, 25 Hun 28 (1881); National
Exchange Bank v. Veneman, 43 Hun 241 (1887).
6. Magee v. Badger, 34 N.Y. 247, 249 (1866); accord, Gramaton National Bank and
Trust Co. v. Mikolajczak, 142 N.Y.S.2d 564, 566 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
7. 17 C.B. 161, 84 Eng. Com. Law 160, 139 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1855).
8. 56 Barbour's 593 (1870).
9. Manufacturers and Traders Trust Co. v. Sapowitch, 296 N.Y. 226, 72 N.E.2d 166
(1947); B. W. Dyer and Co. v. Monitz, Wallack & Colodney, 16 Misc. 2d 1033, 184
N.Y.S.2d 445 (Sup. Ct. 1959); National City Bank of Cleveland v. Cold Mix, 1 N.Y.S.2d
459 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
10. Graham v. White-Phillips Co., 296 U.S. 27 (1935); Merchants National Bank
v. Detroit Trust Co., 285 Mich. 526, 242 NA. 739 (1932).
11. 22 Misc. 2d 351, 193 N.Y.S.2d 367 (County Ct. 1961).
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to his wife for reading, Fazzari was negligent. The Appellate Division,' 2 however, by a sharply divided court, reversed, holding that the Negotiable Instrument Law, section 91, superseded the decision in Lord v. Wilkinson. The
majority briefly stated that, in light of "modern reminder systems" used by
commercial institutions, the "no notice" requirement of section 91 is controlling
and the plaintiff had nootice of the defect. The dissent based its decision upon
the absence of bad faith and a "reasonable interpretation" of the word
"notice." By deciding that Bank was not a holder in due course, this court
found it unnecessary to discuss the negligence, or lack thereof, of Fazzari in
the making of the note. Though it affirmed the result reached by the Appellate
Division, the Court of Appeals in a unanimous opinion, declined to accept the
complete repudiation of forgotten notice stated below and restricted its decision
to the particular facts of the case:
We are not prepared to reject the doctrine summarily and to hold
that once notice is given it is fixed and immutable for all time as to
negotiable instruments, particularly in the case where a blanket notice
is broadcast with relation to stolen bonds and other securities
(Kentucky Rock Asphalt Co. v. Mazza's Adm'r, 264 Ky. 158, 165, 94
S.W.2d 316). But we also think that the doctrine should be applied
with great
caution in the case where a simple promissory note is
13
involved.
The bases of the Court of Appeals decision were, apparently, that:
(1) actual notice of the defect was given the same person who subsequently
purchased the note as agent for the plaintiff Bank; (2) that person gave Fazzari
express assurance that the notice was sufficient to guide the plaintiff; and
(3) a transaction involving a simple promissory note lends itself to rather
elementary precautionary steps in safeguarding the interests of all involved,
particularly where the note is drawn upon a person residing in the same county.
It is normal procedure for a bank to attempt verification of the authenticity
and redeemability of an instrument. Here, then, the plaintiff Bank forgot the
notice given it and failed to exercise reasonable caution in purchasing the note.
The plaintiff Bank in all likelihood relied upon the endorsement and presentation of the note by one of its regular customers. This reliance should not and
14
did not affect the decision since Bank may have recourse against the endorsers,
one of whom was well known to Bank. Certain factors weigh against the decision;
among them are the oral nature of the notice given the Bank by a stranger,
and the length of time between notice and discount, three and one-half months.
Yet, restricted to its facts, the holding does not do irreparable harm to the
negotiability of instruments or place unreasonable burdens of retention of
notice upon commercial institutions, as argued by the New York State Bankers
12.

13 A.D.2d 582, 212 N.Y.S.2d 380 (3d Dep't 1961).

13. 10 N.Y.2d at 400, 179 N.E.2d at 496, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 487-488.
14. See N.Y. Neg. Inst. Law, art. 7, §§ 113-118.
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Association in its amicus curiae brief to the Court, since the great care normally
shown by an institution in such a transaction should prevent recurrence of this
situation. The precedents supporting the doctrine of forgotten notice are not
overruled but are restricted to application in cases where the lack of diligence
of the holder is less evident. The impact of the instant decision is that it
redefines the scope of the doctrine of forgotten notice to provide restricted
application only as an aid in balancing the interests between the innocent but
negligent maker of a note and the innocent but negligent holder, rather than
universal protection for that holder.
R.S.M.
PERSONAL AND REAL PROPERTY
LocAL

REAL ESTATE LIEN TREATED

DEFEATING

PRIOR

AS

EXPENSE OF FORECLOSURE

SALE

FEDERAL LIEN

The defendant owned property subject to the plaintiff's mortgage. The
federal government acquired a lien on all the real and personal porperty of
the defendant including his mortgaged house for unpaid federal taxes. Subsequently, the local government acquired a lien on the house for local real
estate taxes accruing after the filing of the federal lien. The plaintiff moved
to foreclose the mortgage and asked for summary judgment providing that
the property be sold free and clear of the federal tax lien but subject to the
local property taxes and assessments. Summary judgment was granted by the
lower court but the intermediate court ordered reversal. On appeal, held:
reversed, two judges dissenting. State procedure determines the property
interest to which a lien attaches, and in the present case, the lien attaches to
the debtor's or mortgagor's interest, which is solely reflected in the foreclosure
surplus. Local taxes however, are expenses of foreclosure, which must be paid
before such a surplus exists. Buffalo Savings Bank v. Victory, 11 N.Y.2d 31,
181 N.E.2d 413, 226 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1962).'
Federal statute provides that the federal government acquires a lien on
all real and personal property of the taxpayer for unpaid taxes,2 and where the
debtor is insolvent this federal lien has absolute priority.3 Where there is no
evidence of insolvency, the lien shall not be valid against existing mortgages
and becomes valid only when properly filed. 4 New York law provides that local
real estate taxes and assessments are expenses of sale,5 and no surplus shall
exist until such expenses are paid. 6 The Supreme Court has consistently stated
1. Reversing 13 A.D.2d 207, 215 N.Y.S.2d 189 (4th Dep't 1961) and reinstating
26 Misc. 2d 443, 206 N.Y.S.2d 518 (County Ct. 1960), cert. granted sub nom. United
States v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 370 U.S. 915 (1962).
2. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321.
3. 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1958).
4. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(a).
5. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1087.
6. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1082.

